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Knowledge of the body is filtered by perceptual information, recalibrated through predominantly innate stored information, and
neurally mediated by direct sensory motor information. Despite multiple sources, the immediate prediction, construction, and
evaluation of one’s body are distorted.The origins of such distortions are unclear. In this review, we consider three possible sources
of awareness that inform body distortion. First, the precision in the body metric may be based on the sight and positioning sense of
a particular body segment. This view provides information on the dual nature of body representation, the reliability of a conscious
body image, and implicit alterations in themetrics and positional correspondence of body parts. Second, body awarenessmay reflect
an innate organizational experience of unity and continuity in the brain, with no strong isomorphism to body morphology. Third,
body awareness may be based on efferent/afferent neural signals, suggesting that major body distortionsmay result from changes in
neural sensorimotor experiences. All these views can be supported empirically, suggesting that body awareness is synthesized from
multimodal integration and the temporal constancy of multiple body representations. For each of these views, we briefly discuss
abnormalities and therapeutic strategies for correcting the bodily distortions in various clinical disorders.
1. Introduction
When considering the issue of distorted body representa-
tions, it is important to first clarify the relevant terms. The
“body” is a complex physical object between the world and
the brain, and the term “body representation” refers to the
immediate prediction, construction, and evaluation of one’s
own corporal structure and space and those of other bodies.
This account will not address the controversies around
different definitions of the body (body schema, body image,
body ideal, body model, body semantics, body structure, and
topological body), which are variously invoked to explain
clinical “disturbances” following brain damage. As defined
here, body representation refers to the systematic, but tempo-
rary, maps that encode inner and outer sensations, positions,
extensions, and anthropometric aspects of the body and form
the basis of the corporal structure and immediate functioning
in real time. It does not refer to the affective, aesthetic, and
idealized aspects implicit in the everyday use of the term.
Here, we review body representation and bodily distortion
within the context of plasticity in general and awareness in
particular. We do this by considering contributions from
three different sources, while acknowledging that these may
sometimes overlap or be contradictory. First, one may rely
on an awareness of the body that is based mainly on
information about vision and location. This predicts body
image adjustments that are specific to the ways in which the
body appears but with no strong correspondence to implicit
body morphology. Second, the mental representation of the
bodymay reflect an innate organizationwithin the brain areas
that represent the predictable and constant body, preserving
bodily integrity and continuity amid ongoing change. Third,
and more accurately, body image may be based on neural
efferent (motor) and afferent (sensory) information. This
predicts major distortions in the neural representation of
the body as a result of changes in immediate sensorimotor
experiences. All three systems of knowledge have some
empirical support, suggesting that body awareness and alter-
ations thereof are, in fact, synthesis of multiple sources of
information and their multisensory integration. For each of
these contributing systems,we also briefly discuss therapeutic
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strategies to correct one or more bodily distortions in people
with a diseased body and an intact brain, such as those with
spinal cord injuries (SCI).
2. Visual Input in the Construction of
Body Distortions
How the human brain mediates the experience of the body
has generally been examined and guided from the perspective
of disturbances to bodily representations following brain
damage [1–3]. In healthy conditions, ordinary inner and
outer experiences of the body have been evaluated as highly
reliable, precise, and even immune to error [4]. In the
Body Image Task [5], for example, noninjured persons are
able to accurately select templates matching their body size
and to correctly produce tiles depicting isolated body parts.
More recently, however, a quantitative, implicit alternative
to the body map has been used in participants with an
intact brain, demonstrating distortions in the representations
of the body metric of healthy subjects [6]. Participants
identify the location of different body parts on a touch
screen, relative to the anchor (head, foot). Veridical body
dimensions were compared to the relative judged locations
of each body landmark to construct a perceptual body map.
This metric, which is an implicit adaptation of the Body
Image Task, revealed a common overestimation of body
width relative to height [6], suggesting that regular distortions
are related to position and shape between body regions.
Additionally, in building a systematic map of the complete
body, the measurement of individual body parts may be a
logical prerequisite. Distorted measures of width/height are
documented, not only for the complete body, but also for
its parts—even those that are well represented, such as the
hand [7]. Neurally, although the right parietal areas [8] and
insula play a crucial role in processing themetric components
of body representation, recent studies have emphasized the
importance of a large set of visual areas [9, 10]. The lateral
occipitotemporal region is implicated in the visual processing
of the unified body and its individual parts, and these areas
are not active when viewing noncorporeal objects [10, 11].
Among those with eating disorders, the implicit distortion
of the body’s dimensionsmaintains inappropriate attitudes to
body shape andweight; visually, sufferers perceive themselves
to be normal or fat, even if they are emaciated [12]. In such
individuals, neuroimaging studies have demonstrated more
marked functional and structural alterations in these visual
areas, with anomalies in body image processing related to the
self but not to others [13, 14]. A specific association between
therapy-related changes and normalization of the BOLD
signal in these areas suggests that this type of distortion of
the body’s configuration is based on visual contributions [15].
Additionally, body shape and size differ in terms of the
presence of cross-modal illusory information showing the
body stretching and shrinking, indicating that the brain
“believes” the visual information and gives it precedence over
proprioceptive and tactile cues [16, 17]. When multisensory
information is simultaneously available, healthy humans
display a robust tendency to rely on visual information rather
than other forms of sensory modalities, particularly when
dealing with spatial and metric tasks [18–20]. However, the
distortion of the body, evenwhen apparently driven by vision,
may be modulated by multimodality [18, 21]. In the absence
of vision, the distance between two touches on the body in
healthy subjects is perceived to be greaterwhen the twopoints
run across rather than along the body, indicating that the
distortion is not only visual [22, 23]. Additionally, following
anaesthesia, healthy individuals continue to experience the
size, shape, and posture of their body as usual, but there are
also more pronounced distortions of their perceived body
size [24]. The transient effect of an anaesthetic increases the
distortion of the perceived body size, suggesting that body
distortions could be the outcome, enhanced when these are
not filtered through somatic and proprioceptive peripheral
signals [24] or more generally processed multisensorily. In
case of anaesthesia the distortions occur without visual infor-
mation being consulted, in a way that resembles what hap-
pens to healthy subjects in the adaptation of the Body Image
Task previously described. What provokes the disperception
is not seeing the anaesthetized body region, for instance, but
the silencing of some receptive cells that is followed by a shift
of the multimodal inputs to the body neural representation.
In some ways, individuals in absence of sensory motor
signals from peripheral body parts may also paradoxically
be more sensitive to visual body configurations and possible
distortions per se. In this regard, the subjective broadening
of the shoulders in insentient and immobile patients with
an SCI is interesting and reflects the referencing of body
width to the width of a wheelchair [25–27], suggesting that
the absence of normal body sensations may play a larger
role in the perceptual recalibration of the body [28, 29].
When using salient body-assistive tools, the persistent visual
motor exposure to an assistive device becomes an important
mediator of implicit corporeal knowledge. Expert tool use
alters aspects of body representation in both nonhuman
primates [30] and human adults [31] and is essential to
the injured body in those such as immobile and insentient
patients with SCI [32, 33]. The functional normalization of
the body with tools prompts feelings of enhanced awareness
by way of constant and vigilant visual guidance of the
calibration of an insentient body [29, 34], with inevitable
implications for the new bodily perspective of altered images
of the “body-plus-wheelchair” [35]. However, distorted body
configuration in patients with SCI is independent of the body
part considered; overestimations ofwidth compared to height
occur for different body parts, such as the shoulder and ankle,
independent of the degree of sensory motor interruption,
suggesting a plastic experience of body shape that is broadly
mediated by visual means, while also involving tactile and
postural signals [36]. Although the eyes create what we call
an image of the body, the implicit representation of the
body typically occurs within a multimodal context and is
remarkably malleable. Accordingly, evidence of a distorted,
implicit image of the body that we consider to be visual is, in
fact, also tactile and proprioceptive.
As there are no receptors with which to capture body
metrics, the adjustments in perceived body size seem to have
formed indirectly in the brain,marking how the body appears
when regularly updated [37]. While multisensory flows
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provide further information about the implicit bodymap and
cause its distortion, the stability of our experience of the body
is filtered through a predominantly innate representation
thereof and can be massively altered in response to sensory
motor experiences.
3. An Innate Body Map Updated in
the Human Brain
Throughout life, body size and morphology change flexibly
across short time-scales. As individuals pass throughdifferent
stages of development, their health, nutrition, physical activ-
ity, tool use, and other factors can cause modifications to the
size and shape of the body, with adaptations occurring slowly
across the life-span.
Perceptual information about body morphology is cor-
rectly computed and scaled in relation to changes in body
size, such that, from infancy [38] to old age [39], a human can
calculate the spatial requirements needed to allow their body
to pass through a confined region. Even pregnant women,
despite rapid changes to their body form, will flexibly and
specifically adapt to changes in their body configuration,
readily scaling their perceptions to their actual body dimen-
sions to enable them to fit and move through openings of
various sizes [40]. Novice wheelchair users, on the other
hand, fail to fully recalibrate to the spatial requirements
of a wheelchair when judging the body-wheel dimensions
required to fit through an opening [41], suggesting that
adaptation does not occur rapidly and distinguishes between
the self and nonself. However, over a longer time-scale,
many wheelchair users and/or people with SCI perceive
their transformed body’s edges as including their assistive
device [29].These results suggest that, beyond the genetically
prewired body representation, body mapping remains an
inherently plastic process that is formed and constantly
modified by an individual’s experiences [42]. The brain
acquires a realistic and accurate perception of the body in
part through a flow of immediate multisensory information
and in part from the temporal constancy of a stored body
image, providing a unique representation of the body that
enables it to move appropriately in the world. Nevertheless,
most neuropsychological theories (e.g., Melzack’s neuro-
matrix hypothesis [43] and Ramachandran’s reorganization
hypothesis [44]) agree that the brain maintains a relatively
persistent representation of one’s own body. The hard-wired
signature of the body is apparent from the second year of
life [45]. According to the genetically determined view, this
time-frame may reflect the innate organization incorporated
in the sensorimotor cortices [43]. This hypothesis suggests
that the phantom limb phenomenon (in which patients
experience the vivid sensation that a missing limb remains
attached to the body and is in synchrony with other body
parts [44]) emerges in amputees and patients with congenital
amelia (congenital absent limb) because the neuromatrix
spontaneously generates in the brain a corporeal experience
of bodily unity, continuity, and constancy, even in the absence
of inputs from amissing or deafferented limb. Approximately
60–95% of these individuals experience phantom sensations
of their amputated limb [43, 46], suggesting that an imprinted
representation of the body is built into the brain’s topography.
The functionally closely linked somatosensory and motor
cortices maintain this distorted, somatotopic representation
of the body and are part of the discriminative pain network. A
temporary [47] or permanent [48] blockage in the peripheral
body region may contribute to the experience of a phantom
limb, indicating the immediate need to consciously construct
the body as it usually appears. Although generally following
somatotopic mapping, plastic changes may not always match
orderly the proximal spatial relationships in the human brain
[49, 50], indicating that referred bodies may exhibit no
strong isomorphism with respect to the morphology of the
physical or the neural body. Sometimes, the reawakening of
a previously disappeared body part may be disturbing, as in
the case of phantompain. Rather than being just an abnormal
perception, the link between body incongruence and the neu-
ral plasticity resulting from sensory deprivation causes some
pain states. Hence, it is possible that the pain state preserves
local functional and structural representations of the missing
body, driving the plastic changes after deafferentation [51].
According to this view, nonpainful sensations would be a less
prominent marker of somatosensory plasticity [52], although
different studies have shown that the functional reorgani-
zation of the body is not related to painful phenomena.
Consequently, the dissociation, instead of the association,
between pain and coexisting body distortions would be more
informative. Patients with pain describe their deafferented
limb as heavy, floating, swollen, and more enlarged than it
really is, or they maintain that its position is different to
its actual position, indicating that the painful sensation of
the affected limb changes dynamically in reference to body
distortions [53]. However, other studies have demonstrated
that conscious distortions of the body also exist in the
deafferented body, alongwith functional reorganization, even
in the absence of phantom limb pain [53]. Importantly,
homogenous or distinct plastic changes can occur among
the different areas comprising the somatosensory cortex,
each containing a separate body representation [54] with
nociceptive and somatic abnormalities. This picture may
help to reconcile the discrepancy between reports of the
predominant pain, or no pain, involved in body distortions
and neuroplasticity, although future studies are needed to
confirm this.
Therapeutic approaches have been thought to be impor-
tant for acting on the consciously felt, more stable, image of
body also improving the pain. So, in a deafferented body,
the use of visual and somatic inputs to normalize the body
image (imaginative limb stretching, healthy limb to mirror,
myoelectric prosthesis) [44], aswell as pharmacological treat-
ments that produce a reduction in the cortical reorganization
of the body [55], have an analgesic effect. Substituting a more
vague impression of the body may be fundamental to the
body’s functional proprieties or may simply confer greater
responsivity and bodily awareness [42].
In both healthy and deafferented individuals, multisen-
sory experimental stimulation can trigger the complete repre-
sentation of one’s own body.Despite the absence of a limb and
any tactile or proprioceptive processing, visual-tactile inter-
ventions seem to elicit the reemergence of a coherent mental
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representation of one’s own insentient body, for instance,
during the rubber hand illusion (RHI) in individuals with SCI
[28, 56, 57]. We know that in these individuals the illusory
ownership during the RHI does not occur when stimulation
is applied to numb body parts; it is only through residual
sensations that the synchronous stimulation of the sentient
dermatomes induces the sensation of body completeness
and can reawaken body awareness [28, 56]. The illusory
attribution of a rubber hand produces not only a temporarily
induced analgesic effect, but also a progressive and spreading
normalization of tactile sensations. Whether spontaneous or
induced experimentally (e.g., by mirror in amputees), the
sensation that a limb exists, evenwhen it is completely absent,
may indicate the imprinting and awareness of that body zone
established prior to the injury or even in the innate body
map [58]. However, in healthy individuals, it is remarkable
that the brain can so quickly and easily be fooled during the
RHI into accepting a different hand as being part of one’s
own body, especially as the physical body is intact and the
body shape remains integral. Given the innate and permanent
experience of having a physical body, the combined data on
healthy subjects and individuals with body deafferentation
suggest that although the mere sight of one’s physical body
seems to predominate in triggering the immediate perception
of the corporeal experience, the brain’s construction of the
body might rely on multiple perceptions and the temporal
constancy of offline body representations in the human brain.
So, if the sight of the physical body does not seem to be
critical, are distortions and misperceptions of the body the
result of integrated changes in the neural representation of
these body parts? Moreover, what are the neural changes that
may trigger the unity assumption of body awareness?
4. Sensory Motor Experiences in
Body Recalibration
There is increasing indirect evidence of changes in
somatosensory and motor body maps and their interactions
in response to changing afferent inputs and efferent outputs.
After an SCI, for example, peripheral body alterations can
modify the central representation, as large areas of the
somatosensory cortex are deafferented, while areas within
the motor cortex linking to the descending motor system are
deafferented.
Most of the reorganization of cortical body representation
following SCI is documented by the use of techniques such
as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). While TMS allows
researchers to observe excitability changes and map cortical
zones in the preserved and deafferented areas, fMRI is
useful for viewing variations in cortical activity in areas
both close to and distant from these regions. Separately, or
in combination, these techniques provide indirect evidence
of body cortical reorganization and provide an excellent
opportunity to test the sensory motor hypothesis concerning
the modified neural representation of the body.
Several seminal studies have documented how single-
pulse TMS delivered to the primary motor cortex of patients
with a cervical SCI induces an increase in the motor
evoked potentials (MEPs) recorded in twounaffectedmuscles
proximal to the spinal injury, immediately above the lesion
[59]. In addition, when delivered at rest, focal stimulation
evoked MEPs in preserved muscles at shorter latencies.
More sophisticated experimental combinations providing
information on the influence of different cortical regions con-
tingent with the deafferented areas have been documented
in patients with thoracic lesions. These show enlargement
of the motor cortical territories controlling intact body
parts, larger MEP amplitudes, and shortened latencies in the
responses of unaffected proximal muscles [60]. These data
clearly suggest that the motor cortex and/or its corticospinal
projection system may have undergone “reorganization.”
Interestingly, this effect was observed even when stimulating
muscles that were distant from those directly affected by the
lesion, supporting the view that patients with SCI experience
widespread postlesional alterations to brain regions that
represent, construct, and control the body. Against this,
studies of paraplegics have reported reorganization for an
arm muscle represented near the deafferented area, but not
for another arm muscle that is more distant from this area
[61]. It follows that although body areas close to the lesion
appear to undergo neural reorganization, changes to distant
areas are less predictable. Understanding and quantifying the
impact of cortical reorganization on brain areas close to and
distant to injury, along with rehabilitative strategies, remain
controversial and a fundamental topic for future research.
How cortical adaptation to local changes in the body
reflects the integration of cortical plasticity and cortical
reorganization is best investigated using fMRI. Lotze et al.
[62] compared cortical activity during executed movements
of the right elbow, right thumb, lip, and right foot and
imagined movements of the right foot in healthy subjects
and patients with a complete or partial SCI. During lip
and thumb movements, the BOLD signals of both patient
groups were not different from those of the control group.
In patients with a complete SCI, the BOLD signal for the
elbow movements was significantly displaced towards the
disconnected M1 (primary motor cortex), with a shift of
13.3mm. This displacement was not observed in the patients
with an incomplete SCI. Imagined and executed movements
of the foot did not produce a shift or elicit a significant M1
activation in the patients with a complete SCI. The observed
displacement of the elbow representation in the patients
with a complete SCI was interpreted as evidence of primary
motor reorganization, as this body territory is proximal to
the disconnected cortical area. In the patients with cervical
lesions, evidence of adaptation in themotor cortex indicated a
clear effect of the lesion level. Unlike patients with paraplegia
[63], the shift in representation in cases of cervical lesions
involved the M1 region that controls tongue movements;
this area was displaced medially and superiorly, with a shift
of 12.8mm towards the neighbouring disconnected hand
cortex. Moreover, the shift correlated with the SCI level and
the amount of spared motor function; greater hand-tongue
separationwas linked to greatermovement impairment and a
higher injury level. However, pathological changes following
SCI are not confined to the corticospinal tract but also extend
Neural Plasticity 5
to sensory pathways and the primary somatosensory cortex
(S1) [64]. Shifts have been documented in S1 during mouth,
thumb, little finger, and big toe stroking.The thumb and little
finger activationswere displaced by 7 and 13mm, respectively,
towards the midline. The greater medial shift in little finger
activation coincided with lower fractional anisotropy in S1
hand area, as measured by diffusion tensor imaging (DTI),
which would normally innervate the legs of patients with
paraplegia [64].
Collectively, these studies support the presence of neural
plasticity, with the greater enlargement of cortical represen-
tation sites in regions that are nearer to, rather than more
distant from, the deafferented site. They also support the
plasticity interpretation of the observed shifts in cortical
motor and somatosensory representations of specific body
parts. Finally, reactive changes have also been found to occur
in spontaneous neuronal activity of radically affected areas
and slightly affected fringes adjacent to intact cerebral maps.
As a consequence, these patients undergo substantial plastic
changes in the neural representation of the body, which are
associated with alterations in the cortical representation sites,
cortical excitability, and brain connectivity.
The neural changes in these different areas destabilize the
body representation and would be expected to produce expe-
riences of profound alteration. However, conscious feeling
and the conception of one’s own body as an integrated whole
are in fact minimally disturbed. The different topographic
organization is nevertheless fundamental for the functional
proprieties of the body but the neural modifications do not
reach conscious awareness of body image, suggesting we
should consider not only the sensory and motor loss but
also the experience as potential drivers of changes in body
awareness. Additionally, SCI patients are not entirely “disem-
bodied” but instead have an altered or transformed awareness
of their body. Although no longer able tomove or feel, they do
experience a need to attend to bodily care, becoming vigilant
in this regard, oftendemonstrating heightened body attention
[65, 66]. Maintaining a precise visual body representation
following deafferentation could play an important role in pre-
ventingmaladaptive neural plasticity, as there is evidence that
referred sensations, presumably linked to cortical remapping,
can preserve precise topographic organization following SCI.
For example, the increased excitability observed in individ-
uals with SCI could underlie the reorganization of cortical
pathways in a maladaptive way, affecting the neuropathic
pain that some of these patients experience, although this
correlation is yet to be verified [67]. Accordingly, the extent
of the body image distortion involves the plastic modification
of the cortical representation of the body in key areas for
corporeal awareness and pain perception [68].
Therapeutic approaches with repetitive TMS could be
used to reduce neuropathic pain, as well as somatosensory
and motor impairment and spasticity, in patients with com-
plete and incomplete SCI [69]. The repetitive stimulation
would modulate excitability and promote cortical and sub-
cortical reorganization, helping to restore functionality. The
therapeutic use of these techniques exploits the momentary
plasticity that follows the establishment of a deafferented area
until clinical recovery causes a decrease of reorganization
and a shift towards normalized measures [61]. The high
malleability of the neural connections defining the brain’s
precise topography suggests that rehabilitation might exploit
the potential for residual central organization within the
cortex in order to preserve the body representation and
reduce its alterations.
5. Synthesis and Conclusion
The difficulty of assigning precedence to any one of the three
views examined here serves to confirm that the distortions
and mismatching of body representation involve the syn-
thesis of multiple sources of information. Findings related
to plasticity and awareness indicate the existence of several
body maps in the same individual, and these maps may be
said to shift, distort, disappear, and expand. In some cases,
the possibility of major changes resulting from multisensory
information flows and the integration of neural activity leads
to labile changes in the perceived size of body parts and other
unconscious distortions of body configurations, which are
matched or mismatched to the somatotopic map and painful
sensations. Indeed, plastic changes in the physical body,
the illusory constructed body, and the phantom body mean
that curious clinical phenomena and prosthetics—though
unlikely and even conflicting—can coexist in unique ways,
generating temporary, dynamic, and manipulable corporeal
awareness.
Neural plasticity can tell us much about therapeutic
approaches to changing how the distorted body is per-
ceived and felt. A deeper understanding of the different
and potentially conflicting sources informing mental body
maps may facilitate the development of effective treatments
for bodily discrepancies or distortions in altered functions.
For example, procedures that update hard-wired, offline
bodily representations may (at least temporarily) suppress
the pathological phenomena providing the appropriate input.
Therapies designed to preserve or restore precise cortical
topography (even when sensations are transferred to a dif-
ferent cortical territory) may prevent maladaptive plasticity,
preserving body representation and potentially mitigating
nociceptive and somatic abnormalities. Even in these appar-
ently abnormal situations, a sense of normality can be
temporarily restored, inviting explorations of how systematic
rehabilitation might achieve similar outcomes.
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